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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appellants, Mojo Syndicate, Inc., and A Bar Named Sue, LLC, submit this brief in 
the appeal before this Court. 
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Mojo Syndicate, Inc., a Utah corporation, and A Bar Named 
Sue, LLC, a limited liability company (collectively "Mojo 
Plaintiffs"). 
The Defendants-Appellees: 
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an individual (collectively "Fredrickson Defendants"). 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 
78A-3-102(3)0) (2009) of the Utah Code provides that: "The Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction..., over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction^]" This is an 
appeal from the final judgment of the Third District Court in a civil matter and, although 
it has original appellate jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme Court has transferred this matter to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to §78A-3-102(4), which provide that the Supreme Court 
may transfer any matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Whether the Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the dismissal of Mojo 
Plaintiffs' case on summary judgment when Mojo Plaintiffs1 counsel did not provide 
adequate representation and was likely affected by his improper conduct and disability? 
Standard of Review: A constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 
is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, % 20, 262 P.3d 1. The 
appellate court reviews the trial court's application of the law to the facts under a 
correctness standard. Id. "If there are factual findings to review, [the appellate court] 
will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Preservation of the Record: This issue was not preserved in the Trial Court. 
Mojo Plaintiffs' prior counsel, Charles C. Brown, represented Mojo Plaintiffs through the 
litigation phase, filed the Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement, and was later placed 
on "Disability" status by the Office of Professional Conduct. Therefore, Mojo Plaintiffs 
were unable to preserve the issue in the record below. 
(2) Whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment and 
dismissing Mojo Plaintiffs1 claims when the Mojo Plaintiffs substantively followed Rules 
7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in connection with Fredrickson Defendants1 
motion for summary judgment. 
Standard of Review: "Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of 
law, no deference is due the trial court's determination of the issue." Sanderson v. First 
Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 304 (Utah 1992) (citing Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 
757, 79 (Utah 1990)). "An appellate court reviews a trial court's 'legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant of denial of summary judgment' for correctness, and views 'the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn there-from in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.'" Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600, 601 (citing Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231,233 (Utah 1993)). - . 
Preservation of Issue: Mojo Plaintiffs preserved this issue in the record in 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 1421-1562); 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Objection to Proposed Order Granting Summary Judgment, (R. 1731-35); Motion to Set 
Aside Summary Judgment and Request for Hearing, (R. 1919-1959). 
(3) Whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Fredrickson Defendants and dismissing the Mojo Plaintiffs' claims when there were 
genuine issues of material fact that prevented summary judgment on each of the five 
claims? 
Standard of Review: "Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of 
law, no deference is due the trial court's determination of the issue." Sanderson v. First 
Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 304 (Utah 1992) (citing Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 
757, 79 (Utah 1990)). "An appellate court reviews a trial court's 'legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant of denial of summary judgment' for correctness, and views 'the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn there-from in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.'" Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600, 601 (citing Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993)). 
Preservation of Issue: Mojo Plaintiffs preserved this issue in the record in 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 1421-1562); 
Objection to Proposed Order Granting Summary Judgment, (R. 1731-35); Motion to Set 
Aside Summary Judgment and Request for Hearing, (R. 1919-1959). 
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(4) Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding the Fredrickson Defendants their 
attorney fees when the claims did not require the enforcement or interpretation of the 
Asset Purchase Agreement and the awarded fees were unreasonable. 
Standard of Review: The question of "[w]hether a party is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees is a legal conclusion . . . which we review for correctness." IHC Health 
Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, \ 38, 196 P.3d 588; see also Meadowbrook, 
LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998) ("We review a trial court's conclusions of 
law [regarding attorney fees] for correctness, granting no deference to the trial judge's 
legal determinations"). 
Preservation of Issue: Mojo Plaintiffs preserved this issue in the record in their 
Memo in Opposition to Defendants 2938 LLC's Motion and Memo for Attorneys1 Fees 
and Costs, (R. 1802-1809) and Memo in Opposition to Defendants 2938 LLC's Motion 
and Memo for Attorney's Fees and Costs, (R. 1862-1894). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO APPEAL 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(B) (2011). 
(c)(3)(B). A memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's 
facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of 
additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the 
grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as 
affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the 
opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered 
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and supported by citation to supposing materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (2011). 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda 
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there Is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case was originally brought by Mojo Plaintiffs against 3928 LLC, John 
Fredrickson, and Jason Rasmussen2. Mojo Plaintiffs brought suit against the Fredrickson 
Defendants, alleging five causes of action: (1) Rescission based upon Breach of Contract 
and Fraud, (2) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, (3) Civil 
Conspiracy, (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and (5) in the alternative, Breach of Contract. 
Little discovery was performed and Fredrickson Defendants moved for summary 
judgment on all causes of action. The Trial Court granted summary judgment, in part for 
Mojo Plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and 56, 
2
 Rasmussen was a named defendant, but was not served and has not otherwise 
appeared in the case. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and found this was a negotiated transaction to sell the assets of Mojo Plaintiffs to 
Fredrickson Defendants. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Mojo Plaintiffs filed the Complaint with five causes of action: (1) Rescission based 
upon Breach of Contract and Fraud, (2) Intentional Interference with Prospective 
Economic Advantage, (3) Civil Conspiracy, (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and (5) in the 
alternative, Breach of Contract. (R. 1-12.) Mojo Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged the Asset 
Purchase Agreement was void and procured by deception by the Fredrickson Defendants. 
Fredrickson Defendants denied the allegations. (R. 15-25.) Fredrickson Defendants filed 
a motion to conduct expedited discovery and Mojo Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary 
injunction. (R. 44-44A; 48-65.) These issues were settled by stipulation of the parties. 
Very little discovery was conducted and, within five months of the filing of the 
Complaint, Fredrickson Defendants moved for summary judgment. (R. 699-702.) 
Fredrickson Defendants were able to take the depositions of Mark Peterson and Judith 
Peterson, but Mojo Plaintiffs were unable to schedule the deposition of Fredrickson 
Defendants due to Mr. Fredrickson's travel schedule. Mojo Plaintiffs filed a response. 
Due to complications with the filing of certain other motions, Mojo Plaintiffs?s first 
response was stricken and the Trial Court granted Mojo Plaintiffs a second opportunity to 
respond to Fredrickson Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
After the Trial Court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, it 
granted Fredrickson Defendants1 motion for summary judgment and dismissed all causes 
of action. The Court grant the motion for two reasons: (1) Mojo Plaintiffs1 failure to 
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comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and 56 and (2) a finding that the Asset 
Purchase Agreement was a negotiated contract and Mojo Plaintiffs were not damaged. 
(R. 1738-43.) Mojo Plaintiffs immediately filed a Notice of Appeal, which was denied as 
untimely. (R. 1900-03.) The Trial Court also awarded Fredrickson Defendants attorney 
fees under the Asset Purchase Agreement. (R. 1904-08.) 
Mojo Plaintiffs moved to set aside the summary judgment ruling, in part, based on 
the failure to fully conduct discovery, which the Trial Court denied. (R. 1919-22; 2104-
07.) Mojo Plaintiffs filed this appeal. 
Facts established in the District Court Record 
1. Mark Peterson is the son of Judith Peterson. (R. 1559.) 
2. Mark and Judith Peterson hired Attorney John Bates to form Mojo 
Syndicate and Bar Named Sue. (R. 1473.) 
3. On July 10, 2008, Mr. Bates formed Mojo Syndicate, Inc, and Bar Named 
Sue, LLC. (R. 1473.) 
4. Mojo Syndicate, Inc., is the parent company of Bar Named Sue, LLC. (R. 
1453.) 
5. Bar Named Sue, LLC, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mojo Syndicate, 
Inc. (R. 1453.) 
6. Mark Peterson was a president of Mojo Syndicate, Inc., (R. 1559), and a 
manager of Bar Named Sue, LLC, (R. 1452). 
7. Judith Peterson wanted to invest in the construction of a bar, named a "Bar 
Named Sue." (R. 1559.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8. Judith Peterson personally purchased all of the assets of Mojo Syndicate 
and Bar Named Sue. (R. 1476, 1479.) 
9. In the summer of 2009, Mark Peterson was having difficulty with another 
principal, Jason Rasmussen. (R. 1559.) 
10. Mark Peterson believed Rasmussen was mismanaging the Bar and stealing 
money from the Bar. (R. 1476.) 
11. At the end of August, 2009, Mark Peterson enlisted the help of Fredrickson 
to remove Rasmussen from the Bar. (R. 1476.) 
12. Fredrickson was a former neighbor of Mark and Judith Peterson. (R. 1559.) 
13. Mark Peterson knew that Fredrickson has prior experience with running two 
bars and the two discussed forming a partnership to run the Bar successfully. (R. 1502.) 
14. Mark Peterson and Fredrickson discussed the possibility of Fredrickson 
becoming involved in the operations of A Bar Named Sue. (R. 1476.) 
15. Mark Peterson and Fredrickson discussed forming a partnership where both 
would operate and jointly own A Bar Named Sue. (R. 1476-77; 1559-60.) 
16. On September 30, 2009, Mr. Bates drafted a "Certificate of Resolution" and 
"Certificate of Agency Appointment" to remove Rasmussen from the business and give 
Fredrickson broad authority over the business. (R. 1473.) 
17. On September 30, 2009, the parties executed a number of documents, 
including Agency Appointment documents, executed by Mark Peterson, on behalf of A 
Bar Named Sue, Judith Peterson, on behalf of Mojo Syndicate. (R. 1477; 1542-1556.) 
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18. The purpose of these documents was to have Fredrickson assist in removing 
Rasmussen from the business and to make Fredrickson and Mark partners in the business. 
(R. 1502; 1560-61.) 
19. Mark Peterson, as manager of Bar Named Sue, LLC, signed a Certificate of 
Agency Appointment, which appointed Fredrickson as an "authorized agent for the 
purposes of removing Jason Rasmussen from all factes of the existence and operation of 
the Company ... and taking such actions as might be deemed by Mr. Fredrickson to be 
prudent and necessary to secure the Bar Named Sue promises and to establish clear, 
proper, and appropriate business practices ...." (R. 1452.) 
20. Judith Peterson, as secretary of Mojo Syndicate, Inc., signed an Agency 
Appointment Agreement, which appointed Fredrickson as an "authorized agent for the 
purposes of removing Jason Rasmussen from all factes of the existence and operation of 
the Company ... and taking such actions as might be deemed by Mr. Fredrickson to be 
prudent and necessary to secure the Bar Named Sue promises and to establish clear, 
proper, and appropriate business practices ...." (R. 1453.) 
21. The parties also signed a document giving Fredrickson 50 percent 
ownership interest and control of Mojo Syndicate and A Bar Named Sue. (R. 1502.) 
22. The document states that effective October 2, 2009, Fredrickson would 
"assume 50 per cent [sic] control, ownership, and assigned shares of MOJO 
SYNDICATE INC., and a BAR NAMED SUE LLC." (R. 1468.) 
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23. Throughout October 2009, Mark and Judith Peterson and Fredrickson had a 
few meetings, wherein Fredrickson continued to represent that he and Mark Peterson 
would be partnership in ownership of Bar Named Sue. (R. 1478.) • 
24. Fredrickson stated he paid approximately $40,000.00 to the Bar's vendors, 
including the landlord, beer and liquor vendors, payments for the fire suppression system, 
and payments for insurance coverage. (R. 1486.) 
25. On October 13, 2009, Judith Peterson and Fredrickson retained Sean Egan 
to represent Mojo Syndicate in pursuing claims against Rasmussen. (R. 1478.) 
26. On October 15, 2009, Fredrickson formed 3928, LLC, naming himself as 
the only manager. (R. 1462.) 
27. On October 22, 2009, Mr. Bates received an email from Mr. Hollingworth 
with a draft of an asset purchase agreement for Fredrickson's "purchase of A Bar Named 
Sue assets." (R. 1473.) 
28. Mr. Hollingworth sought Mr. Bates1 comments on the documents. (R. 
1473.) 
29. On October 24, 2009, Mr. Bates reviewed the proposed agreement and note, 
but did not have any knowledge of the transaction and "had not been retained by the 
Petersons to assist in any transaction." (R. 1474.) 
30. On October 26, 2009, Mr. Bates sent an email to Mr. Hollingworth with a 
few minor comments. (R. 1474.) 
31. However, neither Mark Peterson nor Judith Peterson retained Mr. Bates to 
represent them or Mojo Plaintiffs. (R. 1474.) 
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: • ... ;^ ivson came to Judith Peterson's home with the 
Asset Pnrrh.M.t \ -- i / r ; J ) 
_ jicibu^ ... i'eteioon, and Fredrickson executed "the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, (R.„ 14^4.) 
" II" I in": \\w\ I'm i'liaso Agieeiiietil spells out it purchase price ul SXOjtOO, ml 
which $40,000 is to be paid at closing ' R (S41 S6 ) . 
35, ' sdilh Peterson received a promissory note for $40,000. (R. 15 13.) 
'. h Wvever. there is no copy of the executed promissory ^c-U 'R 15qM 
i1 sson Nnilt mimics 1'ivdih « -^  :end«uii> i-• j . . *! to 
Bar Named Sue in monthly installments of $2,000.00 until paid hi iun. ^> i+79.) 
38, Additionally, Fredrickson was to receive a dollar-for-dollai credit against 
v iid. i
 amounts that it a ::! anced to the business to cover operations 
prior to closin:i i *v. O42-O0.) 
39. Ill is unknown whether Fredrickson promised he and Mark Peterson w ould 
be partners in Bui Named Sue before and after the signing of the A sset Purchase 
\ iM"ntyn ) 
40. • Mark Peterson stated Fredrickson promised he and Mark Peu 'i -r 
partners of Bar Named ^:r, 'V 1 ^ - ,, . , -
41. • i mdei standing was Mai k Peterson woi lid be 
partners in tliciiai with Fredrickson. (v 1478-79.) 
••.•'42. On November 10, 2009,, the parties signed a Closing Memorandum and 
assignment and bill of sale. iU 1>V| —V;';- .' . :' 
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43. The Closing Memorandum acknowledges the name of Bar Named Sue, 
LLC, was changed to It Could Have Been Fun, LLC. (R. 1557.) 
44. The Closing Memorandum states the parties agree to a dollar-for-dollar 
credit of $40,000, so no money was required of Fredrickson at closing (R. 1557.) 
45. On October 14, 2009, Mojo Plaintiffs filed suit against Rasmussen and 
Fredrickson Defendants. (R. 1-12.) 
46. Mojo Plaintiffs alleged five causes of action, (1) Mojo Plaintiffs filed the 
Complaint with five causes of action: (1) Rescission based upon Breach of Contract and 
Fraud, (2) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, (3) Civil 
Conspiracy, (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and (5) in the alternative, Breach of Contract. 
(R. 1-12.) 
47. Mojo Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged the Asset Purchase Agreement was void 
and procured by deception by the Fredrickson Defendants. (Id.) 
48. Fredrickson Defendants denied the allegations. (R. 15-25.) 
49. Fredrickson Defendants filed a motion to conduct expedited discovery and 
Mojo Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. (R. 44-44A; 48-65.) 
50. These issues were settled by stipulation of the parties. (R. 1833-38.) 
51. Mojo Plaintiffs then filed a motion to amend the complaint, but Trial 
Counsel for Mojo Plaintiffs failed to send the motion and accompanying memorandum to 
opposing counsel. (R. 345-46.) 
52. Very little discovery was conducted and, within five months of the filing of 
the Complaint, Fredrickson Defendants moved for summary judgment. (R. 699-702.) 
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1 ": i: = • I it ic kson Defendants were able to take the depositions of Mark Peterson 
jiii Il Judith fYfctsoii hul f Illi |n I"" I a 1111111 s wen: unable In schedule the deposition ot 
Fredrickson Defendants due to Mr. i-redrickson's ti a \ el and his gii lfriend \ risiting (F! 
1M~ 59.) 
, i III. . ; ; m ; > i i icn <i ^ - i ^ c .i» .Nuhn.r A m e n d e d C o m p l a i n t a n d O r d e r to 
Amended ('omplaml. (I !, 101 I III1 ) '•' 
55. I rial Counsel for Mojo Plaintiffs iiiua die >upplemental Amended 
Complaint (R 1015-70.) 
56 I" 1' Djo I 'laintiffs ttieii liltil a icsponse to the motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 10754137.) •'.." " 
57. The Court signed the Order allowing Mojo Plaintiffs to file an amended 
5S * in .i a^de 
the order allowing M^JO ^ainUHs
 Acavc i,o me an amended comnlar 
resolving other motions before the Trial Court. (R. 1393-97.) 
;
 59. The Trial (\i m I ^ rallied' l""Vln|n I luintiffsa second opportunity to respond to 
1 rcdricksoii j^iuidants ' motion for summary judgment (P I W -97 ) 
60. *' jo Plaintiffs filed a second Response to motion for summai y judgment. 
( . » 
61. I > I'lainliHs also Hied .« iiinlinn Ini lui l l in iliseuven uiulei Rule :'"i'6|l)5 
which the Trial Court declined to hear because it was filed untimely I R I "723-34; 1738-
4 3 . ) ' • ; • ' '•• • •-• " ' i y - ^ ' - •• : - : • 
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62. After a hearing, the Court granted Fredrickson Defendants1 motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed all causes of action. (R. 1738-43.) 
63. The Trial Court granted the motion for two reasons: (1) Mojo Plaintiffs1 
failure to comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and 56 and (2) a finding that the 
Asset Purchase Agreement was a negotiated contract and Mojo Plaintiffs were not 
damaged. (R. 1738-43.) 
64. Mojo Plaintiffs immediately filed a Notice of Appeal, which was denied as 
untimely. (R. 1900-03.) 
65. The Trial Court also awarded Fredrickson Defendants attorney fees under 
the Asset Purchase Agreement. (R. 1904-08.) 
66. Mojo Plaintiffs moved to set aside the summary judgment ruling, in part, 
based on the failure to fully conduct discovery, which the Trial Court denied. (R. 1919-
22; 2104-07.) 
67. Mojo Plaintiffs filed this appeal. (R. 2113-14.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Fredrickson 
Defendants and dismissing all Mojo Plaintiffs1 claims. First, Mojo Plaintiffs1 trial 
counsel, Charles C. Brown, displayed inappropriate conduct and was likely affected by a 
disability, which likely affected his representation of Mojo Plaintiffs and caused the Trial 
Court to incorrectly grant summary judgment. Second, even if this Court determines Mr. 
Brownfs representation was adequate, the Trial Court erred in granting summary 
judgment because Mojo Plaintiffs1 response to the summary judgment motion 
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stibslaiituilh oiiiplied vullh Hit ULilli Rult3 ul t"j\,il hocwiuic. Ilnrd, the hul Court 
n'\v(\ nn piaiitinj11 .'.iiiiiin.iiv nidjj'iiiiiil luvause ^uuimt1 i .suits ul niaieji«il lad pin 11 Hi til 
summary judgment. Lastly, the "I rial Court erred in awaidimj Hredrickson Defendants 
their attorney fees because there was no basis to award attorney fees o\\d 'he Asset 
Court should reverse and remand for a trial on ih« • i .Tits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should Reverse the Trial Court's Dismissal on Summary 
Judgment Because Mojo Plaintiffs' Trial Counsel, Charles C. Brown, 
Displayed Inappropriate Conduct and His Disability Iikely Affected 
His Representation of Mojo Plaintiffs 
Rule 14-501 of the R iiles Governing Utah Bar states, f,The purpose of lawyer 
disciplinary and disability proceedings is to ensure and maintain the .high standard ->f 
professional rnndn.^ i * ,%,- , 
responsibilities a5 lawyers and to piotea the public and the adniu ;-* s. •' u^ < 
those who have demonstrated by their conduct that the} arc unable 01 unlikel) to properly 
disi hargc Ilium piuicssioiiril iftspotisilfililiis Supreme ourt Rules of Professional 
Practice, Chaptei 14, Rules Governing die Utah State H'ii Aiin.-k- \ I .JVU , i DIM mlm<' 
and Disability. Rule 14-501(a) (2011) "T( is basa- th ; he responsibility is upon the ±JUI 
i -i " -.>er\ ise those licensed io pmuki: ,. . • +~ ^~bar;il suspend or discipline 
tlio> tiniitA , * r.t*,i. rions oi pinpn siandiuds Is • :ti : 3 of law is not a right 
accorded all citizens ... In the prudent exercise of the power to discipline in oi iei to 
maintain such standards lies the protection of the public ami of the Bar itself." In Re 
A?-- '"-• tah i^ouj. 
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This Court should reverse the summary judgment ruling dismissing Mojo 
Plaintiffs' claims because Mojo Plaintiffs' Trial Counsel, Charles C. Brown ("Brown"), 
displayed inappropriate conduct during his representation of Mojo Plaintiffs. Brown 
represented Mojo Plaintiffs throughout the trial court proceedings, from filing the 
Complaint (R. 1-10) to arguing the motion for summary judgment (R. 2125) to filing the 
Notice of Appeal (R. 2113-2114) and Docketing Statement (on file herein) in this case. 
However, the Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") of the Utah State Bar filed an 
administrative action against Brown on March 19, 2012. (See Appendix Exhibit 5.) 
Brown's law license was placed on "Disability" status as of March 21, 2012. (See 
Appendix Exhibit 6.) 
While Brown represented Mojo Plaintiffs, he was involved in suspicious (and 
likely illegal) activities. In 2010, the Utah Real Estate Division of the Department of 
Commerce issued a cease and desist order against Brown's law offices, CC Brown Law 
Offices, for negotiating loan modifications. (See Appendix Exhibit 7.) In 2011, the 
Maryland Commissioner of Financial Regulation issued a cease and desist Order to 
Brown's law offices. (See Appendix Exhibit 8, p. 3.) In 2012, the Connecticut 
Department of Banking issued a Temporary Order to Cease and Desist and the intent to 
impose a civil fine against Brown's law offices. (Id.) Additionally, on June 12,2012, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") raided Brown's law offices in Midvale and West 
Valley City, Utah. (See Appendix Exhibit 9.) The Better Business Bureau gave Brown's 
law offices an "F" rating. (See Appendix Exhibit 8.) This conduct was distracting to and 
likely affected Brown's representation of Mojo Plaintiffs. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
liiinvv i is also disabled, His disability lik'lv attectcd Brown's representation of 
Mii|n Plaintiffs Wliilr disahihl\ i'i . ' 'uressanl> .ikn. ' irk iitiun.il n r ond ' || i[" 
attorney's disability status derives from a 'physical or mental condition wliich adversel> 
affects the lawyer's ability to practice la^' r>\ R* Descipline ofTmiilk 201* n s^ 
"I |[ " i '-I I" wl "l ' 111 supersede* ^mci u ,, <. 
Professional Practice, ch. i4, art. v l' l : i > : * : " *u 
has noted, "[ijndeed, since one of the primary purposes of lawyer discipline and disability 
proceedings is to 'protect the public fi om those who have demon-! dec1 In their 
condi ict tha il: the] are i mable tc pi operlj discharge theii professi. ., - K)P^ \hni>c*. 
RLDD 1(a), courts must be concerned with disabled lawyers w In ••^ 
even if no misconduct has-been committed." Id at f^ 2"S, • ' • ••* 
I ICJ c.% Brown's ILin license'was placed on Disability" status as of March 21 "IA1"1 
w ithin weeks of Brown - • ! • • . . 
However, Brcwn n;pi\ <u> Piaintills througnoui ihc tna± phase ui tnis litigation. 
Brown idn^- I "'l.ili Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and 56 in responding to 
Fredricksc- -f.Mi,i<mi • judgmenl. IN IMX-4V) I hi Inul l'ourt 
ga\ e Browr mo uppuii ~ .v^vnu u; Iredrickson Defendants' moiion iilof sninitiiii \ 
judgmenl. 1 0 ^ " r 7 - M?l ] ^ x ~ " ••.•m^ ihe Court: ruled Brown M e d to 
,!.: , - ' . - 4 3 . ) 
Additionally, Brown's other qinrsliormhlr rondnrl iiirhicJiv;- i: •'" 
• •.-• Filing a Request to .Submit anil enter a default against Fredrickson Defendants, 
when no leave of Court was given to file the "Supplemental Amended Complaint" 
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and there was no evidence the document was served upon opposing counsel, (R. 
1328-29; 1393-94); 
Failing to obtain leave of court before filing an amended complaint, (R. 1394-95); 
• Filing a Notice to Submit an ex parte objection to defendants' late filing of 
memorandum contesting plaintiffs [sic] motion to amend complaint without 
enlargement of time and request for enlargement of time for plaintiffs [sic] to 
respond, but there was no motion or memoranda, no evidence that the document 
was served upon opposing counsel, and no basis for an ex parte application, (R. 
1326-2; 1394); 
• Filing a Notice to Submit Mojo Plaintiffs^ motion to file supplemental amended 
complaint because it was not based upon a motion or memoranda, it mis-stated the 
Court's ruling, and there is no evidence that it was served upon opposing counsel, 
(R. 1394-95); 
• Failing to correctly state the Court's ruling from the May 25, 2010, hearing, in the 
September 13, 2010, order prepared by Brown, as well as failing to serve it upon 
opposing counsel, (R. 1394); 
• Failing to adhere to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in responding to a motion 
for summary judgment, (R. 1075-1137; 1395; 1421-1562). 
Brown failed to follow the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. 
Brown was admitted to practice in Utah in 1974, and has been practicing law for over 35 
years. {See Appendix Exhibit 5.) Mojo Plaintiff retained Brown to represent their 
interests as qualified and knowledgeable counsel. The fact that Brown was placed on 
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disability -ilci I us within weeks of his representation ot Mojo Plaintiffs casts doubt on his 
jil mi h i \ | o luiK'linii us J! r o m p d e n l i i t l imm ] l l n w m m H u m in ta i led lo || i n t o n in audi Ihr 
icititionship between his disability and failure to perform cannot be dismissed. • 
Therefore, Mojo Plaintiffs should be granted relief on equitable grounds, as fhe> 
lihiiiill inn corilinl inn Itiin\ iii"1-1 nvtlomianco and1 trusted in his competence as a quulilied 
attorney. This Court should reverse the sumniaiy jiidmiiriil dismissal ami r'tiiaml li> llr 
Ti ial Court, with instruction to allow Moio Plaintiffs an opportunity to adequately defend 
against Predriekson I)* Inn Lulls' inotic - : - r nummary judgment. 
II Even If" this Court Chooses Not to Reverse Due to Mojo Plaintins' 1'rial 
Counsel's Disability, this Court Should Reverse Summary Judgment 
Ruling on Procedural Grounds because Mojo Plaintiffs Substantially 
Complied with Rules 7 and 56. 
'ITie 'I"i mail Court granted summary judgment, in part, based upon Is lojo Plaint iffsf 
failure i .* *..w ?:-
1743., „r„„±Ak,Ai$, Lxv *±icLi Court <jnmted the iiediiokso- ' v- .•'• 
summary judgment on all causes of action, because "the opposing memorandum does not, 
in (act,, conipb, with (lie Rule1- ot Civil Procedure and so procedurally it is defective and 
doesnot, isnot apropermemorandiiiu I uiiilrr \\\c .(iimnah ludjinient iiiolinii IMI n p. 
made by [Fredrickson Defendants." (R 2125, Tr.? 43:1-5.) The Trial Court's ruling 'was 
in Hioi bcLUiiiL dt'spiU1 am lailiiiji' In Mi Brown the Mojn Plaintiffs specifi.ca.lly 
disputed fads .mil • ilnl I . Ilia irrta'd wlit'ia applicable. ' ' • ' " ' 
3
 The exact reasons for the administrative action by the OPC against Brown are 
unknown. The case, OPC v. Brown, Third Judicial District Court, Case no. 120901875, is 
classified as "pri vate" and Mojo Plaintiffs are unable to investigate or learn of the reasons for 
Brown's disability status. Digi ized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"The 'major purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by 
allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue 
to present to the fact finder."' Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, \ 20, 136 P.3d 
1252 (citing Reagan Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984)). 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment and requires 
,f[t]he motion, memoranda, and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7 [of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure]." Id. at 56(c) (2011). Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted 
... [and f]or each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the 
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
Mat 7(c)(3)(B). 
"[T]he trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with [rule 7 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.]" Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ... 5, 156 P.3d 175 
(second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, strict 
compliance under Rule 7 is not necessary if the failure to comply with Rule 7 was 
harmless error. Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, n. 4, 89 
P.3dl55. 
In Metro West, supra, Salt Lake County filed an action to quiet title to certain real 
property on the border of Salt Lake and Utah Counties. Id. at <| 9. Metro West filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing it had legal ownership under Utah's Recording 
Statute and it had adversely possessed the property under Utah's Adverse Possession 
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M 111111" i\i I In I Mill I'IUIII grained summary judc^neri; u\ iavor Metio West, finding 
JVicu ' l 
" ^disputed tacts that [Metro WestJ purchased [the Proper* \ ' loi valuable uonsiderauun 
ivA m gouu .ml! jnd recorded its d?ed ir. Utah Count\ prior 1^  an\ recoi .lin^ z fhere ^\ 
there were "at least two *-e\ aieab ui ui^ j *f* 
i?; ••»pi,opriate.M Mat ' ^23 , 
• . . . npreme * .»*;?! ai^o audre^ed vlcu West's argument tV4 the Count) 
fai * ; • > . - a,.:, u in 
div'iie a s squired under KULL, AbUl(2)(B) oi the Utah ^uuc of Judicial A ministry 
(the predecessor to Rule 7 of *hc Utah Rules of 0 \ H Procedure). I k */ah supreme 
(\ ml mk'.il I In: la ill in in," In comply • , ^;a;.cai requirements was hdui^ess oecause 
»tiie disputed facts were clearly pro vu' • the bod\ -' * 
record references," Id. at n. 4, This reasoning would apply equally here. 
1 lie I Jul i "ouil erred in rulmg ^herc were procedural deficiencies in violation of 
RuJi* 7 because flu; Mn|n PhinliH** M'i mi'lh etch t'onntm n< d fan! Specif ii all), Rule 7 
requires "[fjor each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing parly 
shall provide an explanation, of the grounds for airy dispute " Utah R, Civ. P. 
7(c)(3)(B). 
i! should be noted thai ihe Honorable Sandra Peuler was the assigned judjujc ovci \\w 
Mci- H'est, supra, ease. Judge Peuler is lfu nidge in the present ease also. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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First, a review of the Mojo Plaintiffs' second Response to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Response") lists each controverted fact, with the corresponding 
paragraph from the Fredrickson Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants 
3928 LLC and John Fredricksonfs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memo. Summ. J."). 
(R. 1425-1441.) Mojo Plaintiffs1 Response has 38 numbered paragraphs under the 
heading, "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts." (R. 1425-1441.) These statements of 
fact correspond directly to Fredrickson Defendants1 38 numbered paragraphs under the 
heading, "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts." (R. 707-724.) 
Second, the controverted facts include citations to the record, whether the citations 
are within the "Statement of Undisputed Facts" section or within the "Argument" section 
of Mojo Plaintiffs' Response. For example: 
• Paragraph 7 of Mojo Plaintiffs' Response quotes exactly to the Statement of Fact 
No. 7 in Fredrickson Defendants' Mem. Summ. J. (R. 1428, If 7, and compare R. 
707, T| 7.) Mojo Plaintiffs' Response also cites to John Bates' Affidavit for support 
and raises the issue of the scope of Mr. Bates' alleged representation of Plaintiffs 
and Mark and Judith Peterson. (R. 1428; 1445; 1473-1475.) 
• Paragraph 13 of Mojo Plaintiffs' Response quotes exactly to the Statement of Fact 
No. 13 in Fredrickson Defendants' Mem. Summ. J. (R. 1434, ^ 13, and compare 
R. 708-709, f 13.) Mojo Plaintiffs cite to Mark Peterson's Second Affidavit in 
support of the disputed fact regarding the accounting of A Bar Named Sue. (R. 
1502-1508.) 
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• hvidcncc thai hednckson Defendants are using Mark Peterson's EIN number for 
lll'l.i! Naiiit'd Sin;, I 1 ( illo lilr IIIIMAS, with a citation to (tie Garnishment i- u~ 
Fredrickson. \,iv. i ^^ t , !*': ) 
Therefore. Moi* r laintiffs complies * _iii Rules : ~.~ ;>c u* . n wtuh kales of Civil 
Procedure .;• ..iui Response- They set forth each co-';frov<rfrd fact as requiied b> R ule 7, 
Furtht •< * '• •* : »! •. MI ^ I ^ iijciuc M J; c i t a t i o n s t o 
liiw John J^^ LC6 Affidavit, iiic Stxuiid All s = 
Appointment, and the Second Affidavit of Judith Peterson. Therefore, as in Metro West, 
supra, I hi. Jioputod laets were ck.u pimided in the N V v r-f the memorandum with 
• ipplicablc teioitl ioleiniu^'''1 - Niantially . .: * 
See Mrfro JTestf itefl</y A/«r, Y/*c., 2004 UT at n. 4. 
III. This Court Should Reverse the Trial Court's Dismissal on Summary 
Judgment because Mojo Plaintiffs Presented Evidence of Genuine 
Issues of Material Fact that Prevented Entry Judgment as a Matter IF 
•'•-' L a w . 
"On a motion for summary jndumrnl i in-.il mini <,'hnnld nnt jil lli«,|m(o( 
evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether niaterial issues of fact exist.11 Bear River 
Mm In i "i" Jliams, ,MHIf. I l l \,[)p MM), 1 1 > I -I P.3d 798 (internal citations 
omitted). "In reviewing a j»i\mi of summap, |udfjnu;iil, |lln apitfliak1 -o i i '^ l vhi\v (lie 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn "therefrom in a light most favoiah1* the 
nonmoving p a ^ ' ' - ^ u . / M -. / // *t Srr Leasing G--. 844 P 2d "03 , 304 (Ufa* 
C *n< .jiiL.'M . : . ^ . an initial <n.> *
 : i,c ^ f 
rntitlement to judgment as a matter of law and that there arc no gni"'!fiie issii'^ <»1 ' I 
tact to preclude summary judgment in his favor. Orvis v tohnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 29, 177 Digitized b  the Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Scho l, BYU. 
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P.3d 600. "Once the movant has [met its burden,] 'the burden then shifts to the non-
moving party, who may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.1'1 Stevens v. 
LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, \ 18, 183 P.3d 1059 (citing Orvisv. Johnson, 2008 UT 
2, Tf 18, 177 P.3d 600) (emphasis in original). "To overcome summary judgment, 
plaintiffs must offer at least some evidence that could be interpreted to satisfy the 
elements of the claim...." Waddoups v., Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, 54 P.3d 
1054,1135. 
A. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain Relating to First Cause 
of Action for Rescission of the Contracts for Breach and Fraud. 
"The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, 
and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, \ 14, 20 P.3d 388. "As a general 
proposition, a party to a contract has a right of rescission and an action for restitution as 
an alternative to an action for damages where there has been a material breach of the 
contract by the other party." Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 
1979) (alteration in original). "What constitutes so serious a breach as to justify 
rescission is not easily reduced to precise statement, but certainly a failure of performance 
which 'defeats the very object of the contract' or '[is] of such prime important that the 
contract would not have been made if default in that particular had been contemplated' is 
a material failure." Id. 
Here, the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Fredrickson 
Defendants because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the Contracts Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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should be rescinded due to breach ami hand. Mojo Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action was 
I Reser-si'ni) leased ii|v»n Inr, i h i HI,! Innd < i summary judgment i-ivUncKson 




----nf ? rescission diu •«> ?-* ' because "•* .-jiiienb J : li~ . *^u . uiwiast 
• jicciiien. eoniuHiiv; .; v1 - «.:• ..uitements. »u»i^  I't.Miitiffs were represented by counsel. 
K- rr- ; . ! ; • -. • -^ . . , , a < i e 
Agreement.
 v^. ,26-28.) However vnuine issuer oi mater':v fa/' n i. 
summary judgment. ".:'::;- ' . 
i. Genuine Issues of Fact Exist as to Whether Fredrickson 
Defendants Modified the Asset Purchase Agreement After 
Signing and Prevent Summary Judgment, 
• The Trial Court found "plaintiffs cannot have reasonably relied on a v s<nt:- -
allegedly made in IIKMTI that contradicted the express written terms i»: the pan.— 
agieenienl, whh Hi IMainlilli1; admil illiey w^ned IK I , W 40 ) However, IV' lark Peterson 
and Judith Peterson both provided all * • . . • ! : .<• • • • ,* 
judgment relating to oral representations bv 1 rednckhuii Defendants. i;oi iiioianco, \±<UK 
Petersons Seeuiul Altidavif slates, 'I ilh.iys believed John Fredrickson's statements to 
me when [lieI sai'l dial »u "\»ie ^oinjj In N A liiiii Named Sue because oit the 
three party agreement , and his repeated statements of his intent that we will be partiHT.s 
' 1 2 ; 8 ) . • . - - . - " ' • •-•• ' • • • • ' ' " • ' • • • • • • • . 
•
;
 If these represemaiinns iviic in.idi .illei die signing oi the Asset Purchase 
'Agreement, then "these statements are not precluded h\ (In « nti'ifs Sec \lit l"v< 
Cook, 2002 TIT 11, II, 4, 40 P.ld 1119 ("In I Jtah, parties to a written agreement may not 
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( 
only enter into separate, subsequent agreements, but they may also modify a written 
agreement through verbal negotiations subsequent to entering into the initial written 
agreement, even if the agreement being modified unambiguously indicates that any 
modifications must be in writing.") Further, Mojo Plaintiffs response argued 
"Fredricksonfs affidavit is self-serving and Judith Peterson and Mark Peterson never 
intended to sell A Bar Named Sue." (R. 1436, f 18.) 
Judith Peterson's Second Affidavit also states, "I believe that John added pages to 
the Asset Purchase Agreement after I signed it on October 27, 2009, as I do not recall 
seeing the documents when it was signed." (R. 1271.) She continues, "John Fredrickson 
still has not brought Mark Peterson back in as a partner of A Bar Named Sue." (Id.) She 
testifies, "I own the assets of A Bar Named Sue," (Id. at f 25-26), and that Fredrickson 
Defendants did not pay her $2,000 per month or $40,000.00 up front for his partnership in 
the bar," (Mat 27). 
Further, in Mark Peterson's deposition, he testifies that he, Judith Peterson, and 
John Fredrickson spoke on October 27, 2009, when the Asset Purchase Agreement was 
signed. (R. 782, 232:6-21.) Mark Peterson continues that he and Judith Peterson had 
contact with John Fredrickson after the signing of the Asset Purchase Agreement to sign 
other documents. (R. 782-83.) If Fredrickson Defendants represented that they would 
make Mark Peterson a partner with Fredrickson Defendants after the signing of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, then that prevents summary judgment. (R. 1505.) This issue was 
never addressed. If Judith Peterson owned the assets of A Bar Named Sue, then they 
could not have been sold to Fredrickson Defendants by Mojo Plaintiffs without approval 
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from Judith Peterson personally. (R. 751, 64:3-15; 767, 155:20-768, 156:25.) If 
Fredrickson Defendants did not pay Judith Peterson $2,000 per month, then that is a 
breach of contract. Each of these facts is material and prevents summary judgment. 
The Trial Court should not have weighed the evidence in deciding summary 
judgment. Instead, the Trial Court was required to take all facts and inferences in the 
light most favorable to Mojo Plaintiffs. Had the Trial Court followed the requirements of 
Rule 56, genuine issues of material fact would have prevented summary judgment. These 
facts prevent summary judgment. 
ii. Genuine Issues of Fact Exist as to Whether Mojo Plaintiffs Were 
Represented by Counsel and Prevent Summary Judgment 
The Trial Court found, "Plaintiffs' own attorney drafted certain of the documents 
executed in connection with the parties' agreement" and the Mojo Plaintiffs were not 
subject to duress. (R. 1740.) Fredrickson Defendants repeatedly argued Mojo Plaintiffs 
were represented by counsel. (R. 727.) However, Mojo Plaintiffs1 representatives, Mark 
Peterson, testified in his Second Affidavit that they were not represented by counsel (R. 
1277.) John Bates also testified he was not hired "on approximately October 13, 2009, or 
on any other date, to represent [Mojo Plaintiffs or the Petersons] in the sale of A Bar 
Named Sue." (R. 1265-66.) In their Response to the motion for summary judgment, 
Mojo Plaintiffs stated, "Mr. Bates was not hired by the Plaintiffs in connection with the 
asset sale as they had no intention of selling A Bar Named Sue and were unaware that 
there was going to be a sale of A Bar Named Sue." (R. 1437.) This creates a genuine 
issue of material fact. Mojo Plaintiffs were not represented by counsel and did not confer 
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with any counsel. Therefore, this creates a genuine issue of fact to prevent summary 
judgment. 
iii. Genuine Issues of Fact Exist as to Whether Mojo Plaintiffs 
Received and Accepted Monthly Payments Under the 
Promissory Note and Asset Purchase Agreement. 
The Trial Court found, "[regarding breach of contract allegations, the undisputed 
evidence - including the deposition testimony given by Plaintiffs1 principals - shows that 
Defendants fully complied with the terms of the parties' agreement, including by timely 
making all required payments." (R. 1739.) However, Mojo Plaintiffs provided evidence 
that they never received the payments. Judith Peterson's Second Affidavit states, "John 
Fredrickson stated that he was going to pay me $2,000.00 a month and $3,000.00 a month 
to Mark Peterson under the table and $40,000.00 up front for partnership in the bar, which 
he did not do." (R. 1272, f 27.) Defendants did not provide any evidence of payment in 
full and never provided an accounting of the $40,000 "credit" Fredrickson Defendants 
received in the Asset Purchase Agreement, (R. 1498). Therefore, this creates a genuine 
issue of material fact, which prevented summary judgment 
B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain Relating to the Second 
Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with Prospective 
Economic Relations 
Utah recognizes a common law cause of action for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations. Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
304 (Utah 1982). In order to recover damages under the tort of intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations, the plaintiff must prove "(1) that the defendant 
intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for 
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an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Id. "The 
second element of the tort can be proved in one of two ways. To prove the defendant 
acted with an improper purpose, the plaintiff must prove more than a motivation for ill 
will, but must show that "the defendant's predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff." 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^  20, 116 P.3d 323 (internal citations omitted). 
To prove the improper means, the plaintiff must show the "defendant's means of 
interference were contrary to statutory, regulatory, or common law or violated an 
established standard of a trade or profession." Id. 
The Trial Court found: 
There is no evidence that Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs' economic 
relations or that they acted for an improper purpose or by improper means. 
... the undisputed evidence shows that the parties entered into a valid 
written agreement and that Defendants fully performed that agreement by 
timely paying all of the agreed-upon amounts to Plaintiffs. 
(R. 1740.) The Trial Court found this was a contract between the parties. However, 
again, Mojo Plaintiffs provided material facts that Fredrickson Defendants interfered with 
Mojo Plaintiffs economic relations by (1) representing that Mark Peterson would be a 
partner with the Fredrickson Defendants, (R. 782-83; 1505), (2) never agreeing to sell the 
bar and its assets for $80,000, (R. 1504, f 20), (3) there is no executed promissory note, 
(R. 1504, f 22), (4) the Judith Peterson never received an accounting from Fredrickson 
Defendants regarding the $40,000 he paid and the alleged credit he received in the 
Closing Memorandum, (R. 1498-1499). Each of these facts prevents summary judgment 
because they go toward the allegations that Fredrickson Defendants used an improper 
purpose to take the bar and its assets from Mojo Plaintiffs. 
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Further, the fact that the assets in the Asset Purchase Agreement were owned by 
Judith Peterson, not Mojo Plaintiffs, casts doubt on Fredrickson Defendants1 ability to 
purchase the assets. Fredrickson Defendants could not have purchased the assets if they 
were not owned by Mojo Plaintiffs. (R. 751, 64:3-15; 767, 155:20-768, 156:25.) Again, 
this creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Fredrickson Defendants used an 
improper purpose, and prevents summary judgment. 
The Trial Court also found "there [is no] evidence of injury to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' 
principals acknowledge receiving every monthly payment required by the parties1 
agreement." (R. 1741.) However, Mojo Plaintiffs provided evidence that they never 
received the payments. Judith Peterson's Second Affidavit states, "John Fredrickson 
stated that he was going to pay me $2,000.00 a month and $3,000.00 a month to Mark 
Peterson under the table and $40,000.00 up front for partnership in the bar, which he did 
not do." (R. 1272, Tj 27.) If Fredrickson Defendants did not pay Judith Peterson $2,000 
per month, then Mojo Plaintiffs were injured. (R. 1271.) This disputed fact goes to the 
heart of the third element of intentional interference with prospective economic relations 
and prevents summary judgment. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on Mojo Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective 
Economic Advantage. 
C. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain Relating to Third Cause 
of Action for Civil Conspiracy. 
To establish a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show "(1) a combination 
of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on 
the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a 
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proximate result thereof." Peterson v. Delta Air Linesy Inc., 2002 UT App 56, \ 12, 42 
P.3d 1253 (internal citations omitted). The claim of civil conspiracy requires an 
underlying tort. Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 361, f 21. 
Here, the Trial Court found "there is no evidence that Defendants committed any 
unlawful or wrongful act. ... The undisputed evidence shows that Defendants did not act 
unlawfully. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs have suffered any damages." 
(R. 1741.) However, Mojo Plaintiffs provided evidence Fredrickson Defendants tried 
(and succeeded) in obtaining the assets through the Asset Purchase Agreement without 
paying full value, (R. 1272, f^ 27), failed to uphold promises to keep Mark Peterson as a 
partner, (R. 782-83; 1505), and took assets Judith Peterson personally owned, (R. 751, 
64:3-15; 767, 155:20-768, 156:25). If Judith Peterson owned the assets personally (as 
Plaintiffs alleged), then Mojo Plaintiffs could not sell the personal assets of Judith 
Peterson. It was unlawful for Mojo Plaintiffs to sell the personal assets of Judith 
Peterson. This is a genuine issue of material fact preventing summary judgment. 
Additionally, if Fredrickson Defendants obtained the assets without paying full value, 
then that is likewise unlawful. This, again, prevents summary judgment. 
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain Relating to Fourth 
Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 
The Trial Court granted summary judgment on Mojo Plaintiffs1 claim for breach of 
fiduciary duties, finding T,[t]he undisputed evidence in this case shows that the parties 
dealt at arm's length with each other throughout the negotiation and execution of their 
agreement. ... Under these circumstances of arm's-length negotiation, there were no 
fiduciary duties owed by Defendants to Plaintiffs in connection with the asset purchase." 
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(R. 1741-42.) However, the Trial Court failed to acknowledge the parties were partners 
with one another before they entered into the Asset Purchase Agreement. There is at least 
a question of fact as to whether John Fredrickson owed Mojo Plaintiffs and Mark and 
Judith Peterson a fiduciary duty, and summary judgment is inappropriate. 
The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty for failure to disclose material 
information are "(1) a fiduciary duty to disclose material information, (2) knowledge of 
the information, and (3) failure to disclose the information." Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. 
Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361, \ 20, 246 P.3d 131. Whether a duty exists is a legal 
question, which courts analyze by "examining fthe structure and dynamics of the 
relationship between the parties1 including their legal relationships1 and 'the duties created 
by [those] relationships."' Id. (citing Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, ^  14, 
143 P.3d 283). "Age, knowledge, influence, bargaining power, sophistication, and 
cognitive ability are but the more prominent among a multitude of life circumstances that 
a court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is owed by one party to another." 
Id. at If 16. However, "normally partners 'occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal 
with each other in the utmost good faith."' Ong, Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 
P.2d 447,453-54 (Utah 1993). 
Here, John Fredrickson owed a fiduciary duty to Judith Peterson and Mark 
Peterson because they signed the partnership agreement on October 2, 2009. (R. 815.) 
The partnership agreement provides that John Fredrickson would assume "50 per cent 
[sic] control, ownership, and assigned shares of MOJO SYNDICATE INC., and A BAR 
NAMED SUE LLC." (R. 815.) Thus, from October 2, 2009, forward, Fredrickson owed 
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fiduciary duties as a partner to Mojo Plaintiffs and Mark and Judy Peterson. From that 
time, Fredrickson owed a duty to Mojo Plaintiffs and Mark and Judy Peterson to inform 
them of his conduct involving the partnership, including obtaining a liquor license, (R. 
1460), not planning to make Mark Peterson a partner in the new venture, (R. 1443; 1503-
05), and providing Mojo Plaintiffs with financial and accounting records, (R. 1504). 
Each of these is material facts that Fredrickson Defendants should have disclosed to Mojo 
Plaintiffs and Mark and Judith Peterson. This information went to the heart of John 
Fredricksonfs partnership with Mark and Judith Peterson and involved the structure of the 
bar. Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
E. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain Relating to Fifth Cause 
of Action for Breach of Contracts. 
The Trial Court found, "the undisputed evidence in this case - including the 
deposition testimony of Plaintiffs' principals - shows that Defendants fully complied with 
the parties' agreement, including by timely making all required payments to Plaintiff. (R. 
1742.) However, as discussed in Section II.A. above, there are genuine issues of material 
fact that prevent summary judgment. "The elements of a prima facie case for breach of 
contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of 
the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, \ 
14,20P.3d388. 
Here, genuine issues of fact exist as to whether Fredrickson Defendants performed 
their end of the bargain or whether they breached the Asset Purchase Agreement with 
Mojo Plaintiffs. In the Complaint, Mojo Plaintiff pled, in the alternative, that Fredrickson 
Defendants failed to pay the $80,000, failed to provide the $10,000 to Mojo Plaintiffs, 
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and failed to return Mark Peterson's personal property. (R. 9-10.) Mojo Plaintiffs raised 
issues of fact, such as "John Fredrickson stated that he was going to pay [Judith Peterson] 
$2,000.00 a month and $3,000.00 a month to Mark Peterson under the table and 
$40,000.00 up front for partnership in the bar, which he did not do." (R. 1272, f 27.) 
Defendants did not provide any evidence of payment in full and never provided an 
accounting of the $40,000 "credit" Fredrickson Defendants received in the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. (R. 1498-99.) If Fredrickson Defendants promised to provide an accounting 
after the Closing Memorandum was signed and never did, then that is a breach of the 
contract and a genuine issue of fact preventing summary judgment. 
The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Fredrickson 
Defendants and in dismissing Mojo Plaintiffs' Complaint. There are genuine issues of 
fact that exist and prevent judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the ruling and allow the parties to finish discovery and proceed to trial. 
IV. This Court Should Reverse the Award of Attorney Fees to Fredrickson 
Defendants because Summary Judgment was Inappropriate and Mojo 
Plaintiffs Did Not Sue to Enforce or Interpret the Contracts. 
mAs a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and 
only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.1" Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. 
Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361, f 44, 246 P.3d 131 {citing Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 
2009 UT 60, H 32, 218 P.3d 598); see also Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 
P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "Where there was a right to attorney fees, Utah 
courts have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to 
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recover the fees attributable to those claims on which the party was successful." 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed Sav., 791 P.2d at 221. 
The Trial Court found, "The Asset Purchase Agreement (the Agreement) permits 
attorney fees where 'either party brings an action at law or inequity to enforce or interpret 
this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees, 
court costs and expert witness fees/" (R. 1833.) "The Agreement's attorney fee provision 
is broad and only requires either party to bring an action to 'enforce or interpret' the 
Agreement to award fees to the prevailing party." (R. 1834.) The Trial Court awarded 
Fredrickson Defendants reasonable attorney fees "associated with all filings leading to the 
Court's Order on summary judgment," reasoning that Plaintiffs complaint set forth five 
claims for relief, all of which required the Court to interpret and enforce the Agreement to 
grant summary judgment. (R. 1834.) However, Mojo Plaintiffs' causes of action 
included (1) Rescission based on breach and fraud, (2) intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, (3) civil conspiracy, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, and (5) 
in the alternative, breach of contract. (R. 1-10.) The second, third, and fourth causes of 
action have no bearing on the Asset Purchase Agreement and did not require the Trial 
Court to "interpret or enforce" the Agreement. These allegations involved conduct 
separate and apart from the Agreement. 
The Trial Court awarded Fredrickson Defendants "reasonable" fees in the amount 
of $73,052.85. (R. 1906.) However, the Trial Court awarded Fredrickson Defendants all 
requested fees, from the initial filing of the Complaint and Answer to filing to Amended 
Declaration of Attorney's Fees and Costs. (R. 1842-59.) These fees were unreasonable. 
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Fredrickson Defendants requested $19,617.00 in fees for "Defendants' Motions for 
Preliminary Injunction, to Amend Complaint, and for Appointment of a Receiver," (R. 
1846-48; 1859), which the Trial Court acknowledged was "settled after all pleadings had 
been filed," (R. 1906). The Trial Court should not have awarded Fredrickson Defendants 
$19,000 in attorney fees on an issue that was settled. 
Moreover, the Trial Court awarded Fredrickson Defendants $16,347.75 in attorney 
fees for "Depositions and Discovery." (R. 1848-1851; 1859.) Defendants only took two 
depositions, of Judith Peterson and Mark Peterson, and propounded discovery requests on 
Mojo Plaintiffs. Mojo Plaintiffs never took the depositions of John Fredrickson and 3928 
LLC, (R. 1704-05), and Fredrickson Defendants did not produce documents requested by 
Mojo Plaintiffs, (R. 1704). In fact, the record shows very little discovery was conducted. 
There were two Notices of Subpoena Duces Tecum to Judith Peterson and Mark Peterson, 
(R. 28-43), and two Notices of Depositions, one for Judith Peterson and one for Mark 
Peterson, (R. 327-344). Then Fredrickson Defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 699-1010.) A fee award of over $16,000 for depositions and discovery is 
not reasonable. 
Lastly, the Trial Court erred in awarding Fredrickson Defendants $17,962.25 in 
attorney fees in connection with the motion for summary judgment. Counsel for 
Fredrickson Defendants spent 32.75 hours, or $6,526.25, in drafting the motion for 
summary judgment, (R. 1853-54), and 22.25 hours, or $4,566.25, in drafting the reply 
memorandum, (R. 1854-55). Counsel for Fredrickson Defendants also spent 18.4 hours, 
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or $3,808.50, in preparing for and attending the summary judgment hearing, which was 
only one hour. This award is unreasonable. 
The Trial Court erred in awarding Fredrickson Defendants their attorney fees. The 
fee was unreasonable and inappropriate, in light of the fact that there were genuine issues 
of material fact that prevented the entry of summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellants Mojo Syndicate, Inc., 
and Bar Named Sue, LLC, respectfully request this Court reverse the Third District Court 
and remand to the Trial Court for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this *pj®~ day of July, 2012. 
NELSQNjf SMUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
pr, Jr. 
Tahnee L. Hamilton 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Attorneys for Defendants John Fredrickson and 
3928 LLC 
FILii DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAH - 6 2011 




IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
MOJO SYNDICATE, INC., a corporation, 




1 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 100904277 
3928 LLC, a limited liability company, 
JASON RASMUSSEN, an individual, JOHN 
FREDRICKSON, an individual, and JOHN 
DOESI-IV, 
Defendants. 
Judge: Sandra Peuler 
Defendants 3928 LLC and John Fredrickson's ("Defendants") Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Motion") came before the Court on November 30,2010. Plaintiffs were 
represented by their counsel, Charles C. Brown of CC Brown Law, LLC. Defendants were 
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represented by their counsel, Andrew V. Collins and J. Ryan Mitchell of Mitchell & Barlow, 
P.C. Having heard oral argument and reviewed the relevant briefing and documents in support 
of, and opposition to, the Motion, and otherwise being fully advised in the premise, the Court 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES that Defendants' Motion is GRANTED in its 
entirety. The grounds for this decision are as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the Motion does not comply with the 
requirements of Rules 7 or 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governing memoranda 
submitted in opposition to summary judgment motions. In light of Plaintiffs' non-conforming 
opposition memorandum, and the materials submitted by Defendants in support of the Motion, 
summary judgment in Defendants'favor is proper. 
2. Additionally, as a separate and independent ground for granting summary 
judgment, Defendants' briefing, and the evidence submitted therewith, shows that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact for trial and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on all claims asserted by Plaintiffs. Specifically, the grounds for granting summary 
judgment to Defendants on each of Plaintiffs' claims are as follows: 
a. Plaintiffs' first claim for relief seeks rescission based on breach of 
contract, fraud, and duress. Regarding the breach of contract allegations, the undisputed 
evidence—including the deposition testimony given by Plaintiffs' principals—shows that 
Defendants fully complied with the terms of the parties' agreement, including by timely making 
all required payments. Regarding the fraud allegations, as a matter of law under Gold Standard 
v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996), Plaintiffs cannot have reasonably relied on any 
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statements allegedly made to them that contradicted the express written terms of the parties' 
agreement, which Plaintiffs admit they signed. Because reasonable reliance is a necessary 
element to show fraud, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their fraud allegations. Regarding the duress 
allegations, the undisputed evidence shows that the Plaintiffs were not subject to duress at any 
time in the course of the subject transaction. Indeed, the parties' agreement was negotiated and 
executed over a period of weeks, during which Plaintiffs could have backed out at any time. 
Plaintiffs' own attorney drafted certain of the documents executed in connection with the parties' 
agreement. As a matter of law under these circumstances, Plaintiffs were not subject to duress. 
Accordingly, summary judgment in Defendants' favor is proper on Plaintiffs' first claim for 
relief 
b. Plaintiffs' second claim for relief alleges intentional or negligent 
interference with prospective economic advantage. This claim requires Plaintiffs to show that 
Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs' economic relations for an improper purpose or by improper 
means in such a way that caused injury to Plaintiffs. See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co, v. 
Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy 
any of these requirements. There is no evidence that Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs' 
economic relations or that they acted for an improper purpose or by improper means. To the 
contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that the parties entered into a valid written agreement 
and that Defendants fully performed that agreement by timely paying all of the agreed-upon 
amounts to Plaintiffs. Nor is there any evidence of injury to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' principals 
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acknowledge'receiving every monthly payment required by the parties' agreement. Accordingly, 
summary judgment in Defendants' favor is proper on Plaintiffs' second claim for relief. 
c. Plaintiffs' third claim for relief alleges civil conspiracy. A claim of civil 
conspiracy requires, among other essential elements, evidence of one or more unlawful, overt 
acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy and damages as a result of the alleged conspiracy. 
See Peterson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56,42 P.3d 1253. In this case, there is no 
evidence that Defendants committed any unlawful or wrongful act. To the contrary, the * 
undisputed evidence shows that Defendants acted lawfully and properly at every turn throughout 
the course of the subject transaction. Defendants' lawful intent to purchase the assets of A Bar 
Named Sue, as well as the terms of that purchase, were folly disclosed and well-documented in 
the parties'written agreement and the related documents. The undisputed evidence shows that 
Defendants did not act unlawfully. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs have f 
suffered any damages. Accordingly, summary judgment in Defendants' favor is proper on 
Plaintiffs'third claim for relief. 
d. Plaintiffs'fourth claim for relief alleges breach of fiduciary duties. Asa 
matter of well-established law, however, parties that deal at arm's length do not owe each other 
fiduciary duties. See Gold Standard, 915 P.2d 1060. The undisputed evidence in this case 
shows that the parties dealt at arm's length with each other throughout the negotiation and 
execution of their agreement. Independent counsel represented each side of the transaction, and 
the final terms of the parties' agreement were the result of the negotiations between counsel. 
The written documents, which all parties admit having signed, clearly set forth the terms of the 
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parties' agreement and their mutual intent for 3928 LLC to purchase the specified assets from 
Plaintiffs. Under these circumstances of arm's-length negotiation, there were no fiduciary duties 
owed by Defendants to Plaintiffs in connection with the asset purchase. Accordingly, summary 
judgment in Defendants'favor is proper on Plaintiffs'fourth claim for relief. 
e. Plaintiffs', fifth claim for relief alleges breach of contracts. However, as 
noted above, the undisputed evidence in this case—including the deposition testimony of 
Plaintiffs' principals—shows that Defendants fully complied with the parties' agreement, 
including by timely making all required payments to Plaintiffs. Given this undisputed evidence, 
summary judgment in Defendants' favor is proper on Plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief. 
3. Because summary judgment is proper on each of Plaintiffs' claims, the Court 
ORDERS that all claims asserted against Defendants shall be, and hereby are, dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits. 
4. At the November 30,2010, hearing on the Motion, the Court directed Defendants' 
counsel to file a motion on the issue of an award of attorneys' fees and costs, which the Court 
will consider in due course in subsequent proceedings. This Order may be amended following 
the Court's ruling on such motion to reflect any award of attorneys' fees and costs. 
ENTERED this £? day of^puv^^ 2011 . 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this jyday of December, 2010,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be delivered via first class mail, postage prepaid to: 
Charles Craig Brown 
CC BROWN LAW LLC 
1338 South Foothill Drive, #300 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOJO SYNDICATE, INC., et ah, 
I Plaintiffs, 
v. 
3928 L L C . , etfii., 
Defendants. 
RULING AND PARTIAL ORDER 
CASE 100904277 
i 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
This matter came before the Court on defendants request for attorney fees. The 
Court has determined that oral argument will not help its resolution of the issues as they 
are straightforward and the applicable law is clear. The Court having fully reviewed all ^  ^ 
relevant pieadj^ 
Defendants Prevatled in their Defense of the Case
 :;: i 
In Utah, M: party is entitled to attorney fees oniy where they are authorized by 
statute or contract. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust. 2004 UT 85, fl 23. The Asset 
Purchase Agreement (the Agreement) permits attorney fees where "either party brings 
an action at lawibr inequity to enforce or interpret this Agreement, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled;|o recover reasonable attorneys fees, court costs and expert witness 
fees." Agreement. 1J12. Defendants clearly prevailed in this action when the Court 
granted summary judgment in their favor on all of plaintiffs claims. See Dec. 3.2010 
Order; and see blsen v. Lund. 2010 UT App 353, fl 12 (noting that a determination of 
which party prevailed focuses "on 'which party had attained a 'comparative victory,' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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considering whdt a total victory would have meant for each party and what a true draw 
would look like.f (citations omitted)). This was a total victory for defendants. 
Under Utah law, however "[i]f attorney fees are recoverable by contract, '[a] party 
is entitled only tp those fees attributable to the successful vindication of contractual 
fights."' Cache County v. Beus. 2005 UT App 503, fl 16; and see Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. 
Wardlev Corp., 2010 UT App 361, fl 52. From those particular fees, the Court will only 
award reasonal^e attorney fees, and the Court has "'broad discretion in determining 
what cohstitute^a reasonable fee/" EDSA/Cloward. L L C , v. Klibanoff. 200& UT App 
284, fl 8 (citations omitted); and see Cache County, at fl• 7.;'/ ; f^/-v:?;S->;.' 
Defendants Are Entitled to an Award of Fees Associated [y^K^--'^ 
Prevailirilg on their Deife of Plaintiffs Claims to Enforce oK/v- -vy 
•••-
;;-^ ••JnterpretitheAqreem 
' . " ' " • • • ' . ' : ? - '.-'-•:--"' ' " • • ' • • " • • • . ^ • • ' • . . v v . • . • • ' • • ' ' . . . . . - . ' • • } ' , y - : - . • • • • . ' • - • • • ' • • • • • • ' . . • ' • • " ' • • : • • . • . • ' . : • • • • • / . \ - v . - - : ^ . ' • ' • • : • • • ' • ' " • • ' • • • • • . • • 
The Agreement's attorney fee provision is broad and only requires either party to 
bring an action fp "enforce or interpret" the Agreement to award fees to the prevailing 
party. Plaintiffs complaint set forth five claimsforreljef/allofwhich required the Court 
to interpret and enforce the Agreement to grant summary judgment. See Dec. '3. 2010 
Order. The Coup determines that, as the prevailing party, defendants are entitled to 
reasonable feesfessociated with all filings leading to the Court's Order on summary 
judgment. Further, because the Agreement provided for an award of attorney fees, 
defendants are entitled to reasonable attorney fees for the pleadings associated with 
this motion. SeeX)lsen. 2010 UT App at 1J15 (noting that a '"provision for payment of 
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attorneyQ fees in a contract includes attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party on 
appeal as well ds at trial, if the action is brought to enforce the contract.'" (citations 
omitted)). Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable fees associated with 
prevailing on all of plaintiffs claims to enforce and interpret the Agreement. 
Defendants Are Only Entitled to Reasonable Attorney Fees. 
. ' V 
Defendants' entitlement to attorney fees is a wholly different matter from the 
reasonableness|pf those fees. While the Court may not ignore a prevailing party's right 
to attorney fees£it "enjoys considerable discretion in fixing the ampunt of a reasonable 
• • • • , : ' . ' - • • $ ' • • . • • • • • • • / : • ; • • • ; •• • / : • • • • • ; • 
fee . . .grid ma)|award considerably less than requested so long as the reduction is 
" • . ' . ' • ' .
 :
 . • " . . '
 -
 * ' • ' • • • • . ' • • • • • • . . - . . • ' • • - . . • . • • • ' • ' • ' ' ' • • . • ' • ' ' ' " ' * • • ' • • ' - ' . • ' . • • : • • ' . • • ' • . ' • ' ' • • • 
• • " • • ' . - • "
 ;
- ' • ' • • • ' - ' ' " ' , B '•• • • ' ' • • ' • ; • • : • ' • - . ' . . • • • • ' : • • " • ' . • . : • • ' : - ' : . - ' ' " ; ' • ' : • • ' . 
supported bv adequate findings," Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Sporl, 2000 UT App 
195 (Mem. Decision) (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985. 988 (Utah 
1988), Rappleve-v. Rappleve. 855 P.2d 260, 266 (UT App 1993) and Martindale v. 
Adams. 777 P.^ l 514, 517-18 (UT App 1989)). A court does not measure 
reasonableness^by what prevailing counsel actually bills in a case, nor by the hours 
spent. Cabrera € Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). Rather, the Court considers: 
1. Wfrat legal work was actually performed? 
2. Hdiv much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is f ie attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility? 
Dixie. 764 P.2d.|t 990 (citations omitted); and see Rappleve. 855 P.2d at 266 
• • % • . ' . - 3 - ; • ' . 
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i 
4 
(reversing trial cburt's attorney fee award for abuse of discretion, where the trial court 
made no findings to show it considered the relevant factors in determining the * 
reasonableness^ an attorney fee award). 
Defendant filed an affidavit and fee request for over $70,000 in fees and costs 
for prevailing in this action. However, the affidavit makes no mention of the 
reasonablenessgof the fee request; nor does it set forth the attorneys' billing rates; nor 
• • ' • / • ' • ' . ' • ' ' . . • • • ; ' • • . . 
does it justify th | amount of work performed, despitethe short duration of this case. * 
There is some reference to reasonableness in the memorandum and in the earlier 
request for sanctions that the Court reserved, but those references are not evidence on 
; :which the Coiirt^an m 
declafations of defendantsVc^ 
that defendants1;have not set forth evidence from which the Court can determine that < 
their fee requests reasonable. 
Defendants are Only Entitled to Reasonable Costs, Authorized by the 
Agreement. < 
The Agreement allows the prevailing party to recover "court costs and expert 
witness fees." Defendants have requested $2,639.85 in costs. Defendants are entitled 
to $18.50 for th^: witness fee for Sean Egan, pursuant to the Agreement. 
The remainder of the costs request comprises $2621.35 for copies. The Court 
. ' " : • ' • ' • ' £ * • ' . . . " • ' ; ; • • ' • ' • • . '••'• ' : : • ' • . • ' • • ' ' . ' . 
V > . • ' • . ' ' • ' ' • ' " • . • ' • ' • " . • • ' • • ' • 
does not as a general matter find support in Utah case law for an award of the cost of ^ 
copies, particularly where there is no attempt to show information could not be obtained 
i . ' • ' ' . . ' . ' ' ' • • ' • : • • • • • ' • • ' • • • • ' • ' • • 
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through less expensive means nor that the copies where reasonable and necessary to 
the litigation. See e.g. Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App 201, fl 30 (instructing that 
a court should review a contract provision for costs "with an implied term of 
k 
reasonableness^"). No evidence supports awarding these costs to defendants. 
Based oriUhe foregoing, the Court orders that defendants are entitled to an 
:
 - i ? ' ' • : ' " • ; • • . . . . " 
\ ' • • • ' . • • ' • : ' • • ' ' • 
award of reasonable attorney fees and $18.50 in costs. The amount of the fee award is 
to be determine^ from an amended affidavit defendants may submit, which sets forth 
the reasonableness of the fee request based on the factors the Court must consider. 
Defendant may respond to that affidavit, and the Court will rule once a request to 
submit has beenfiled., 
Dated thil /c£dav of April 2011. 




idra N. Peuler (v ' l O ^ ^ S J 
trict Court Judge \ S%'^;^\$^$ 
. . ^ 
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 100904277 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: CHARLES C BROWN 193 E FORT UNION BLVD STE 300 MIDVALE, UT 
84047 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOJO SYNDICATE, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 




Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
This matter came before the Court on: defendants' request for attorney fees, the 
amended declaration and defendants' motion for sanctions. The Court has considered 
all pleadings and relevant law and determines oral argument will not assist it in 
resolving the issues as they are straightforward and the applicable law is clear, Having 
now been fulling informed/the Court rules and orders as follows. 
SANCTIONS ^ : : ' ' ; ^ 
Defendants' motion for sanctions asks the Court to sanction plaintiffs' attorney 
for several allegedly misleading and improper filings, and asks the Court to require 
plaintiff to pay defendants' attorney fees. While certain filings by plaintiffs have lead to 
confusion and inaccuracies in the record, defendants have hot requested sanctions 
pursuant to any rule or other legal basis. Nor do defendants cite to any support for an 
award of sanctions in addition to a prevailing party's award of attorney fees. There is no 
basis for the request and defendants' request for sanctions is denied. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The Court's prior ruling and partial order cited the relevant case law on attorney 
. ' . ' •' - 1 - • . . • ' ' 
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fees and specifically articulated the factors the Court must consider in making any 
award of reasonable attorney fees. A prevailing party must demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the fees and must at least "substantially answerQ the questions 
contemplated by Dixie State Bank." EDSA/Cloward. L L C , v. Klibanoff. 2008 UT App 
284, H 17 (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988)). In • 
response, defendants supplemented their request for fees. 
The Court determines that the attorneys' billing rates, and the average rate of 
$208.34, are reasonable and consistent with the rates that attorneys of similar 
experience charge in Salt Lake City for cases of this nature. The Court has additionally 
considered the legal work that was actually performed and how much of that work was 
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute this matter. • 
Plaintiff objects to the fees for several reasons, claiming the request is 
unreasonable because the total contract price waspnly for slightly more than the fees 
generated. The Utah Supreme Court has noted however:, 
The total amount of the attorneys fees awarded . . . cannot be said to be 
unreasonable just because it is greater than the amount recovered on the 
contract. The amount of the damages awarded in a case does not place a 
necessary limit on the amount of attorneys fees that can be awarded. 
Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). Plaintiffs also claim the fees are 
unreasonable because two attorneys were billing, and that only 3928 requests the fee 
award. However, both defendants prevailed on summary judgment and the fees do not 
reflect an unnecessarily duplication of work. In fact, having an attorney with a lower 
' -2- .. 
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hourly rate draft pleadings, while both attorneys appear at hearings, is a common 
strategy and often saves money. 
The Court notes that plaintiffs' filings generated a substantial amount of 
defendants' attorney fees as they required defendants to perform additional work to 
adequately defend this matter. The Court considers the following examples: the 
preliminary injunction, which settled after all pleadings had been filed; several improper 
ex parte filings; the premature notice to submit on the motion to amend, which caused 
the Court to erroneously grant the motion and then set it aside; the untimely appeal; 
and objections to the summary judgment order, which were denied. 
' ;• The Court haying considered ^  the Dixie 
factors and having previously determine are entitled to reasonable 
fees associated with all filings leading to the Court's Order on summairy judgment, 
determines that defendants are entitled to a fee award of $73,052.85. This amount 
does not include the $1,627.50 for the fees generated in relation to the amended : 
declaration, as Utah's case law is clear and defendants should have provided the 
necessary information on reasonableness in their initial request for fees. 
COSTS 
Defendants also amended their request for costs to $2,635.85 in costs. As the 
Court previously noted, the underling agreement allows a prevailing party to recover 
"court costs and expert witness fees." The Court has awarded defendants $18.50 for 
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the witness fee for Sean Egan. The Court will award an additional $1,449.40 in costs for 
the Peterson depositions, but not for both amounts as there is no information as to why 
a double award for Mr. Peterson's deposition would be reasonable. According, 
defendant are entitled to a total award of costs of $1,467.90. 
It is so Ordered. Defendants are to prepare a judgment consistent with this 
Order. 
Dated this^H day of June 2011. 
By the Court: 
K£& 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOJO SYNDICATE, INC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JOHN FREDRICKSON, et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
' Case No. 100904277 
August 29, 2011 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Pending before the Court is a Request to Submit for Decision on plaintiffs' motion to 
set aside summary judgment. Also pending is defendants' motion to strike the affidavit of 
Angela Brown. Based upon a review of the relevant pleadings, the Court rules as follows. •,••••• 
1. The request for oral argument is denied, The issues are straight-forward and clear, 
and oral argument would not be of benefit to the Court in entering a ruling. 
2. The defendants' motion to strike the affidavit of Angela Brown is unopposed, and 
based upon defendants' memorandum in support of their motion, it is granted. 
3. The plaintiffs' motion to set aside summary judgment is denied. This ruling is based 
upon the following. 
First, although defendants argue that the plaintiffs' motion was untimely, this decision 
is not based upon that issue, but rather on the substance of the motion. Although defendants 
argue that it should have been filed after the January 6, 2011, ruling, the final judgment was 
not entered until July 19, 2011. Therefore, the July 26, 2011, motion to set aside the 
summary judgment is timely. 
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As to the substance of the motion, plaintiffs first argue pursuant to Rule 56(f), that i 
discovery is not complete. Although plaintiffs identify several areas of discovery they wish to 
pursue, that motion is untimely. The time to raise that motion was prior to the summary 
judgment being considered by the Court. The Court notes that the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment was submitted for decision on September 24, 2010, and argued 
November 30, 2010. Both sides had filed substantive memoranda in connection with the i 
motion, and no Rule 56(f) motion was filed before the summary judgment was submitted for 
decision. . V 
The plaintiffs did previously file a Rule 56(f) affidavit. On November 24, 2010, plaintiffs first 
Rule 56(f) affidavit was filed, with a motion and memorandum filed on November 29, ait 5:19 
p.mf, the evening before the scheduled hearing. Because of the untimeliness of the 56(f) \ 
motion ancl affidavit, the Court refused to entertain argument on it. Thereafter, the 
defendants' motion for sunnmary judgment was granted. Both the November 56(f) motion as 
well as this one were filed untimely, relative to discovery. 
Plaintiffs next argue that Rule 59 (a) (1-7) provides a basis for the Court to set aside 
the summary judgment. Plaintiffs, however, set forth no analysis.-of the rule relative to the 
facts of this case, but simply argue that "belatedly discovered evidence" entitles them to a 
new trial. Plaintiffs' conclusory statements are insufficient to provide a basis for setting aside 
the summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs also argue that Rule 60 (b) entitle them to set aside the judgment. Again, 
however, plaintiffs set forth little for the Court to review relative to the facts of this case. While 
plaintiffs do not identify the sub-section of the rule under which their motion relies, they 
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mention sub-section one (1), excusable neglect, and three (3), fraud. However, apart from 
setting forth applicable law, plaintiffs do nothing to analyze how those sections apply to this 
case. Without an analysis, the Court is left to guess at plaintiffs' argument. Based upon that, 
the plaintiffs' arguments fail to provide a basis for setting aside the judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b). 
4. Defendants seek a supplemental award of attorneys fees. I decline to award 
supplemental fees for the present motions. 
This minute entry is the final Order of the Court in the matter, and no further order is 
required to be prepared by counsel. 
DATED this Zf\ dav;rQfft\fg8si?/2011, 
( 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 100904277 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: CHARLES C BROWN 193 EAST FORT UNION BLVD STE 3 00 MIDVALE, UT 
84047 
MAIL: ANDREW V COLLINS 6 4 6 5 SOUTH 3 0 0 0 EAST STE 203 SALT LAKE CITY 
UT 8 4 1 2 1 
Date: <%•: 5 > Q - \ \ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
p^rr«^ 1 M a s t ) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 5 
OPENING BRIEF 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT vs. CHARLES C BROWN 
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TODD M SHAUGHNESSY 
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Plaintiff- OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
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Traci Gundersen (#9172) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Commercial Enforcement Division &rv»r->-
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor REoEiVfcD 
P.O. Box 140872 MAY IU 2flffl 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6711 
Phone:(801)366-0145 waDkOfconur^cw* 
BEFORE THE UTAH RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE REGULATORY, 
COMMISSION 
In the Matter of STIPULATION & ORDER u, 
CC Brown Law Offices ' ° 
CASE NO. 46896 
The Real Estate Division of the Departmentof Commerce of the State of 
Utah (the Division), by and through its counsej/traci Gundersen, and CC Brown 
Law Offices (Respondent), a Utah licensedTaw Office, by and through its 
counsel Philip Danielson, hereby stipulates and agrees as follows: 
TPULATION 
1. Respondent is not currently a licensee of the Division. 
2. Respondent, for purposes for settlement only, admits the jurisdiction of the 
Utah Residential Mortgage Regulatory Commission (the Commission) over 
Respondent and ove/the subject matter of this action. 
3. A cease ajra desist order in this matter has been brought and filed 
pursuant to tyd provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 61-2c-402(2)(e) (2009). 
Respondeat specifically waives the right to confront adverse witnesses, to 
present evidence or call witnesses on its own behalf, and to the right to a bearing 
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 61-2-1, et seq.. (2005 as amended) and the rules 
promulgated there under. Respondent and the Division hereby express their 
o 
K> 
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intent that this matter be resolved expeditiously through stipulation as 
contemplated in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(4) (2008). 
4. The Division and the Respondent recognize and agree that this Stipulation 
alone shall not be binding upon the Commission or the Director of the Division of 
Real Estate (Director). If the Commission or the Director do not concur in the 
disciplinary action proposed herein, this Stipulation shall be null and void and a 
hearing shall be scheduled for this matter; and the Respondent waives any claim 
of bias or prejudgment which the Respondent might otherwise have with regard 
to the Commission and Director by virtue of the Commission and the Director 
having reviewed this Stipulation, and this waiver shall survive any such 
nullification. 
5. Respondent acknowledges that when this Stipulation is presented to the 
Commission and Director, the Commission and the Director may ask the 
Division investigative staff questions about the facts underlying this Stipulation or 
about the terms of this Stipulation. Respondent agrees that the investigative 
staff may answer such questions. Respondent will have the right to be present 
when the Stipulation is presented and to address the Commission and the 
Director about this Stipulation or the facts underlying it. If the Respondent 
desires to be present to address the Commission and Director, the Respondent 
may contact Renda Christensen at the Division by calling (801) 530-6750 for 
information about the date, time and place of the meeting at which this 
Stipulation will be presented to the Commission and the Director. 
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6. Respondent acknowledges that upon approval by the Commission and the 
Director, this Stipulation shall be made a part of the attached final Order, and 
shall be the final compromise and settlement of this matter. 
7. Respondent affirms that the Respondent enters into this Stipulation 
voluntarily, and the only promises or understandings the Respondent has 
obtained from the Division, or any member, officer, agent or representative of the 
Division, regarding this Stipulation are contained herein. 
8. Division Investigators received a complaint concerning an internet website 
that was advertising and soliciting for loan modifications by a law office. The 
website was operated by the law office of CC Brown Law Offices. Upon review 
of the website, the law firm indicated that they offered to negotiate loan 
modifications. 
9. Charles C. Brown met with the Division Investigator Marv Everett to 
discuss the law firm's website and Mr. Brown stated that their office was 
negotiating loan modifications. The Division directed Mr. Brown to remove any 
reference to soliciting loan modifications on their website. It is the Division's 
position that CC Brown Law Offices was being "principally engaged in the 
business of negotiating residential loans" by the firm's potential clients, that it was 
not exempted from licensure under the law, and that CC Brown Law Offices 
needed to have a Utah mortgage license to conduct such business. 
10. It was later discovered that the CC Brown Law Offices' website had been 
revised but still advertised loan modifications. A call was placed to CC Brown 
Law Offices. An employee named Reid answered the phone and confirmed that 
the law office was still negotiating loan modifications. 
11. An Order was mailed from the Division to CC Brown Law Offices 
instructing them to cease and desist from negotiating loan modifications. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12. A representative of CC Brown Law Offices met with Division staff and 
indicated a willingness to comply with the Division's position by refraining from 
soliciting and performing loan modifications without a Utah mortgage license, 
unless the Respondent is not being principally engaged by the potential client in 
the business of negotiating residential loans. 
13. While Respondent does not admit to a violation of any state statutes, it 
does admit that it was soliciting for and providing loan modifications. 
14. U.C.A. Section 61-2c-201 (Effective 01/01/10). Licensure required of 
person engaged in the business of residential mortgage loans - Mortgage officer 
- Principal lending manager. Specifically, Respondent will comply with the 
following: 
61-2c-201(1) Unless exempt from this chapter under Section 61-2c-105, a 
person may not transact the business of residential mortgage loans without 
obtaining a license under this chapter. 
61-2c-201(2) For purposes of this chapter, a person transacts business in 
thisstateif: 
(a) (i) the person engages in an act that constitutes the business of 
residential mortgage loans; and 
(ii) (A) the act described in Subsection (2)(a)(i) is directed to 
or received in this state; and 
(B) the real property that is the subject of the act 
described in Subsection (2)(a)(i) is located in this state; or 
(b) a representation is made by the person that the person 
transacts the business of residential mortgage loans in this 
state. 
15. CC Brown Law Offices agrees that it shall not become principally engaged 
to negotiate a loan modification at any time unless licensed with the Division. 
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16. Respondent acknowledges that it has been informed of the right to be 
represented by legal counsel and that if the Respondent has waived this right, 
the Respondent has either sought the advice of an attorney or has voluntarily 
chosen not to do so. 
17. As full settlement of all the issues raised in this Stipulation, Respondent 
agrees as follows: 
a. Respondent will pay a $5,000.00 civil penalty to the Division 
of Real Estate. 
b. Respondent will pay the above $5,000.00 to the 
Division within 60 days after the date the Commission 
and the Director of the Division sign the final Order in 
this matter; 
18. This document and all other documents incorporated herein by reference 
constitute the entire agreement between the parties herein and supersedes and 
5 cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations, understandings, or 
agreements between the parties. There are no verbal agreements which modify, 
interpret, construe, or affect this agreement. 
19. Respondent acknowledges that this Stipulation and Order, once adopted, 
will be classified as a public document and may be issued to the public upon 
request. Respondent acknowledges that the Division may inform other persons, 
entities, and state and federal agencies of the action taken on the Respondent's 
license and the contentSfpf this Stipulation and Order. 
DATED this ^-f^ day of ifilUj ..... , 2010. 
CharJe r^CYaig Brown, Owner 
RESPONDENT 
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f
 davof ^  DATED this T day of ' *7 ,2010. 
Danielson, Counsel for Respondent 
DATED this / day of M A ^1 ,2010. 
Traci Gundersen, 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ORDER 
The Commission and the Director approve and adopt the foregoing 
Stipulation of the parties. Based upon the foregoing Stipulation and for good 
cause appearing, the Commission and the Director order as follows, effective on 
the date of this Order: 
In lieu of holding a hearing on the matter, the Respondent agrees: 
1. Respondent will pay a $5,000.00 civil penalty to the Division of Real 
Estate. 
2. Respondent will pay the above $5,000.00 to the Division 
within 60 days after the date the Commission and the Director of 
the Division sign the final Order in this matter; 
SO ORDERED THIS J 7 day of IffflfA^ , 2010. 
UTAH RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE REGULATORY COMMISSION: 
wr/s, LANCE MILLER, CHAIR 
MARALgEjENSENT^ICE CHAIR 
-Afo//?f 
RODNEY "BUTCH" DAILEY 
4hh fMrrtt^c 
HOLLY ISTENSEN c: 
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The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this day of 
Hx ^ , 2 0 1 0 . ^ X " ) 
lyjji^^ joj? ATX_ 
DEANNA D. SABEEY, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
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